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Abstract
As the majority perpetrators of sexual violence, it is  plausible to see men as responsible for 
war rape not only as individuals,  but also as collective bystanders,  facilitators and 
beneficiaries. Following recent criticisms of individual legal and moral responsibility for rape 
as a war crime in international law, this article examines how we might think of war rape as 
a collective action in moral and sociological terms. First, it assesses existing moral arguments 
for the responsibility of men in groups for rape, primarily with reference to the work of 
Claudia Card, Larry May and Robert Strikwerda. Critiquing elements of these arguments, 
it explores the difficulties in talking about ‘men’ as a coherent group and in discussing 
‘collectives’  themselves. Second, the article draws out the connection between accounts of 
moral responsibility and accounts of causal responsibility. Drawing on critiques of collective 
responsibility and the long-standing agency/structure problem, it argues that causal 
accounts focusing on structure pose a serious challenge to ideas of both individual and 
collective moral responsibility. The complexities of the relationship between moral and 
causal claims are illustrated through a discussion of Susan Brownmiller and Catharine 
MacKinnon’s influential perspectives on rape. The seeming paradox of responsibility  is 
emphasised as a problem to be addressed by gender and feminist perspectives that seek to 
pursue both ethical and sociological inquiry into the workings of masculinity and the 
political means for undoing gendered wrongs.
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From prehistoric times to the present,  I believe, rape has played a critical 
function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by 
which all men keep all women in a state of  fear.
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will2
And that is  what is wrong with collective responsibility. Precisely because it will 
not reduce, it precludes you from getting at anybody – all you can do is wave flags 
and write poems. But in fact, it was this person’s grandfather who was brutally 
murdered by that soldier and his buddies, this other person’s sister who was raped 
and tossed down a well, these people over here who were herded into a gas 
chamber, by these particular soldiers. Only individual agents can do such things – 
this grandfather and that sister were not murdered by an irreducible entity. And 
neither was anyone else who was in any way harmed.
Jan Narveson, 'Collective Responsibility'3
I’m not going to try to tell you that I’m different from all the rest
I’ve been subject to the same de-structure of  desire and I’ve felt the same effects; 
I’m a hetero-sexist tragedy. And potential rapists all are we.
...
I had different desires prior to my role-remodelling. 
And at six years of  age you don’t challenge their claims. 
You become the same. 
...
(Or withdraw from the game 
And hang your head in shame)...
I fought against their further attempts to convince a kid that birthright can bestow 
The power to yield the subordination of  women and do you know 
What patricentricity means? I found out just a couple of  days ago. 
It means male values über alles and hey! Whaddaya know… 
Propagandhi, 'Refusing To Be A Man'4
Rape and sexual violence are acts overwhelmingly carried out by men against women. This 
much is widely accepted. While recent years have seen serious discussion of the ways in 
which men are subjected to gender violence in war, as well as greater attention to political 
violence carried out by women and to the rape of men, the balance of harm remains starkly 
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2! Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Wi!: Men, Women and Rape (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 15, emphasis in 
original.
3! Jan Narveson, ‘Collective Responsibility’, The Journal of Ethics 6, no. 2 (2002): 185, emphasis added.
4! From Propagandhi, Less Talk, More Rock (Fat Wreck Chords, 1996).
unequal.5  For example,  9% of the victims of rape and sexual assault surveyed by the US 
Department of Justice between 1992 and 2000 were male, a proportion roughly matched by 
more recent data.6  It is now also frequently accepted that rape is a very common and 
perhaps central phenomenon in most, although not all, wars.7 
Against this backdrop, calls for more attention to men's experiences of rape and gendered 
violence (and to cases of rape by women) nevertheless still see women and girls as 
overwhelmingly the victims of sexualised aggression, with men and boys remaining the 
“majority perpetrators”.8  So, although the precise definition of several key terms ('men', 
'women', 'rape', 'violence', 'acts')  are the subject of some dispute and debate, the view of men 
as those who do rape and women as those who rape is  done to persists.9 Focusing the questions 
in this way risks eliding male victims of sexual violence – and female perpetrators of it – 
altogether.10  This article focuses on male perpetrators for two reasons. First, this is how 
understandings of responsibility in feminist and gender theory have thus far been conceived, 
and I am concerned with how these accounts of morality and causality work. Second, as 
'majority perpetrators',  men are deserving of analytical attention, attention which may well 
open to scrutiny the connections and the disjunctures between perpetrators, enablers and 
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5! See R. Charli Carpenter, ‘‘Women and Children First’: Gender, Norms, and Humanitarian Evacuation in the 
Balkans 1991–95’, International Organization 57, no. 4 (2003): 661–694; Adam Jones, ‘Straight as a Rule: 
Heteronormativity, Gendercide, and the Noncombatant Male’, Men and Masculinities 8, no. 4 (2006): 451 –469; 
Miranda Alison, ‘Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security’, Security Dialogue 35, no. 4 
(2004): 447–463.
6! Karen G. Weiss, ‘Male Sexual Victimization: Examining Men’s Experiences of Rape and Sexual Assault’, Men 
and Masculinities 12, no. 3 (2010): 275–276; U.S. Department of Justice, National Crime Victimization Survey: 
Criminal Victimization, 2010 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=2224.
7! Inger Skjelsbæk, ‘Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex Relationship’, European Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 2 (2001): 211–237; Janie L. Leatherman, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); Elisabeth Jean Wood, ‘Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime 
Rape Rare?’, Politics & Society 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161.
8! Miranda Alison, ‘Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity’, Review of 
International Studies 33, no. 1 (2007): 84.
9! For examples of dispute and debate see Eric Reitan, ‘Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept’, Hypatia: A 
Journal of Feminist Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2001): 43–66; Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Making Sense of Masculinity and 
War’, Men and Masculinities 10, no. 4 (2008): 389–404; Laura J. Shepherd, ‘‘Victims, Perpetrators and Actors’ 
Revisited: Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) 
Violence’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9, no. 2 (2007): 239–256. On the persistence of 
men as perpetrators and women as victims see Patricia D. Rozée and M.P. Koss, ‘Rape: A Century of 
Resistance’, Psychology of Women Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2001): 295–296.
10! On this point, see particularly Laura J. Shepherd and Rosemary Grey, ‘‘Stop Rape Now’?: Theorising 
Masculinity, Responsibility and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence’, Men and Masculinities 15, no. 4 (2012).
refuseniks, and between men, masculinities, and gender orders.11
This article addresses two major issues in the understanding of men, masculinities and rape. 
First, it assesses how much responsibility we should attribute to men for rape in war and 
peace. After surveying debates around the character of responsibility and the forms of 
individual legal and moral responsibility implemented by current international practice, I 
examine the idea that men as a group bear a kind of responsibility for war rape. I argue 
that, while attributions of collective responsibility bring the facilitation of rape by men, and 
the benefits provided to men by rape, into clearer focus,  they face a corresponding problems 
in limiting responsibility to men as a group and in the concept of  a ‘collective’ itself. 
Second, I ask how our moral and ethical accounts of responsibility for rape might be 
connected with our explanations of why rape happens and, more broadly, our conceptions 
of patriarchy itself. Drawing on the critique of collective responsibility and the agency/
structure problem, I elaborate on some existing connections between causal and moral 
responsibility, using the work of Susan Brownmiller and Catharine MacKinnon for 
illustration. In particular, I highlight the paradox that strong assertions of gender orders and 
structures as causally responsible for war rape threaten to diminish claims that men, 
individually or in groups, can be held morally responsible for acts of  sexualised aggression.
In pursuing these agendas,  what follows mixes ethical reasoning with social theory. The 
affinities and parallels between these two domains are complex in character and frequently 
elided in academic discussions. What follows is intended as an opening up of the bonds 
between these different ways of discussing rape and an impetus to examine how our 
conjoined judgements of cause and blame matter. If my claim that there is a strong tension 
in our attributions of responsibility holds, how might we continue to pursue both a 
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11! For example, the important study of sexual violence in the DRC cited by Shepherd and Grey, gives figures for 
four kinds of sexual violence (men on women, men on men, women on women, and women on men). They 
found 195 cases of male perpetrators and 77 cases of female perpetrators. Sexual violence carried out by women 
on men was by far the lowest of the figures, with only 11 cases, of which 8 involved female combatants. The 
number of women who reported rape (as distinct from the wider category of sexual violence) was also much 
higher, at 17.7% of all women respondents, compared to 4.4% for men) (Kirsten Johnson et al., ‘Association of 
Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations with Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 304, no. 5 (2010): 
557). These figures do unsettle a number of easy assumptions about perpetrators and victims, but do not 
overturn the generalisation that males tend to be perpetrators, and females victims, of sexual violence.
sociological analysis of gender that goes beyond individualism and a political and ethical 
feminism that holds perpetrators of harm accountable for wrongs? Is it possible, following 
Propagandhi, to refuse to be a ‘man’, and what might we understand that category to mean?
The Problem of  Responsibility for War Rape
Responsibility talk comes in several guises. It is common to distinguish between moral, legal, 
causal and sometimes political responsibility. Moral responsibility provides the vocabulary for 
discussing guilt and blame and thus often provides guidance as to who should be punished 
and which courses of action it is ethically right to follow. Legal responsibility designates the 
appropriate subjects of prosecution and sanction in particular systems of law and justice, 
although it is commonly argued that legal responsibility should reflect moral responsibility.12 
Causal responsibility,  by contrast, establishes how events came about. It traces patterns and 
relationships as part of an explanation for a given outcome. Although causal responsibility is 
often attributed to human agents, it is  not necessary to think either in terms of individual 
humans or collectives of humans to speak of causation. Political responsibility refers to the 
contested process of identifying an agent or agents as culpable for a particular wrong 
principally by virtue of their public role, usually because they are formally in charge of a 
situation where wrongs came about, or because they are collectively complicit in political 
wrongs.13  In what follows, I am mainly concerned with the distinction between moral and 
causal responsibility and their interaction, although there will also be mention of legal and 
political forms of  responsibility.
Although often related, these kinds of responsibility are conceptually distinct. We may hold 
someone legally and politically responsible for the same reason we find them morally and 
causally responsible, but this need not be the case. Take a typical hypothetical example: a 
young child is playing with a gun which goes off, killing their brother. A conventional answer 
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12! For the connection between moral and legal responsibility see Lynne Henderson, ‘Rape and Responsibility’, 
Law and Philosophy 11, no. 1 (1992): 127–178 and Nicole Laviolette, ‘Commanding Rape: Sexual Violence, 
Command Responsibility, and the Prosecution of Superiors by the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, Canadian Yearbook of International Law 36 (1998): 93–150.
13! See Kimberly Hutchings, Global Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 177–178 and the 
discussion in Kirsten Ainley, ‘Excesses of Responsibility: The Limits of Law and the Possibilities of Politics’, 
Ethics & International Aﬀairs 25, no. 4 (2011): 422–427.
to the problem of responsibility in this case is to say that the child is causally  responsible, 
since their brother would not have died if they had not pulled the trigger, but not morally 
responsible (or legally  or politically  responsible), because they lacked a proper understanding of 
their actions and did not intend to kill in any morally significant sense.14  This is taken to 
reflect the lack of capacity on the part of the child and the corresponding difficulty of 
saying that they should have acted differently.15  Legal and moral responsibilities can 
similarly be in tension, as in many examples where breaking an unjust law is seen as the 
proper ethical decision. The different kinds of responsibility are linked in the sense that our 
answers to questions about one kind of responsibility are likely to follow from, or lead to, our 
answers regarding the other kinds. Being consistent about how we relate causal, moral and 
legal responsibility is  often the justification for thinking about responsibility at all.16 In other 
words, these different senses of  responsibility are connected, but not synonymous.
In addition to the various kinds of responsibility, there are also different forms that 
responsibility can take. Most familiarly,  someone can be directly responsible for an action 
because they carried it out themselves. But both individuals and wider collectives might be 
responsible in further senses. Command responsibility provides for situations,  like those 
encountered in war, where military or civilian leaders are held to have certain obligations 
regardless of whether they themselves carried out atrocities.17  We can also speak of 
responsibility by omission, as when bystanders fail to intervene, and facilitating responsibility, 
where we contribute to an outcome without having direct or command agency.18  As we will 
see, there is also an argument for responsibility by benefit, where individuals received some 
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14! See Hidemi Suganami, ‘Causal Explanation and Moral Judgement: Undividing a Division’, Mi!ennium: Journal of 
International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 719–720.
15! For the classic discussion see Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, The Journal 
of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829–839.
16! See, for example, the interesting discussion in Kirsten Ainley, ‘Individual Agency and Responsibility for 
Atrocity’, in Con'onting Evil in International Relations: Ethical Responses to Problems of Moral Agency, ed. Renée 
Jeﬀery (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 37–60.
17! Laviolette, ‘Commanding Rape’; Toni Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The 
Case of States and Quasi-States’, Ethics & International Aﬀairs 15, no. 2 (2001): 67–85; Neta C. Crawford, 
‘Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity’, Journal of Political Philosophy 15, 
no. 2 (2007): 187–212.
18! Larry May, The Morality of Groups: Co!ective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Virginia Held, ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally 
Responsible?’, The Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 14 (1970): 197; Virginia Held, ‘Group Responsibility for Ethnic 
Conflict’, The Journal of Ethics 6, no. 2 (2002): 157–178; Stanley Bates, ‘The Responsibility of ‘Random 
Collections’’, Ethics 81, no. 4 (1971): 343–349.
identifiable reward by virtue of  others having carried out an act of  harm.19
	
Exploring these distinctions also brings into question what entities can be held responsible in 
the first place. Moving beyond direct individual responsibility has prompted some to theorise 
the ways in which we might hold mobs, corporations, states and even random collectives 
responsible.20  Toni Erskine, for example, argues that states are institutional moral agents 
because they conceive of themselves as units, have stable identities over time which are 
greater than the combined identities of their constitutive peoples and because their internal 
decision-making structures make them capable of moral deliberation and agency, even if 
this capacity is not held equally by all states.21
In the case of wartime sexual violence, these conceptual distinctions generate a number of 
pressing problems of analysis, ethics and politics. Over recent decades feminists inside and 
outside the academy have been active, and effective,  in developing the idea that rape is a 
weapon of war requiring concerted action at the level of traditional high politics. In doing 
so they have implicitly constructed arguments connecting together various kinds of 
responsibility for war rape, mirroring the process of politicising 'peacetime' rape in national 
and domestic debates.22  The focus of these pressures has often been the legal system, 
emphasising the individual legal and moral responsibility of perpetrators and aiming for 
improvements in conviction and sentencing. 
Most visibly, feminist NGOs played a major part in the passage of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000, the first Security Council resolution dedicated to 
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19! Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, ‘Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape’, Hypatia: A Journal of 
Feminist Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1994): 134–151. See also Larry May, Masculinity and Morality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998).
20! See May, The Morality of Groups; Larry May, ‘Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility’, Philosophical 
Studies 43, no. 1 (1983): 69–82; Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents’; Held, ‘Can a 
Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?’ respectively.
21! Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents’.
22! See Paul Kirby, ‘How Is Rape a Weapon of War?: Feminist International Relations, Modes of Critical 
Explanation and the Study of Wartime Sexual Violence’, European Journal of International Relations OnlineFirst 
(February 10, 2012), http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/02/10/1354066111427614.
acknowledging and combating the gendered violences of war and armed conflict.23 Building 
on feminist arguments developed in earlier war crimes tribunals, legal responsibility for rape 
thus became more clearly visible both in UN policy and in the cases brought by the nascent 
International Criminal Court (ICC).24  Preventing impunity for direct perpetrators and 
military commanders continues to be a major theme in NGO activism on issues of peace 
and gender.25
This emphasis reflects the prominence given to the role of the ICC and to issues of 
prosecution and impunity in UNSCR 1325 itself, with at least some activists  initially 
confident that important provisions around prior sexual conduct and expert testimony in the 
Rome Statute would mean that international law would not be as selective, nor serve the 
interests of power as egregiously, as it had in the past.26  In contemporary political discourse, 
these issues are also often framed in terms of the responsibility to protect (R2P), with 
concerns that the opportunities presented by 1325 have not been properly operationalised 
by existing security actors, despite the existence of guidelines on how to do so.27  Appeals to 
concepts like R2P instantiate certain conceptions of responsibility in global politics, 
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23! United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325. S/RES/1325 (United Nations, 2000), www.un.org/events/
res_1325e.pdf; Felicity Hill, Mikele Aboitiz, and Sara Poehlman-Doumbouya, ‘Nongovernmental 
Organizations’ Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325’, Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 4 (2003): 1255–1269; Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Power and Authority in the 
Production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’, International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 2 (2008): 
383–404.
24! For those earlier arguments see Laviolette, ‘Commanding Rape’; Karen Engle, ‘Feminism and Its 
(Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, The American Journal of International 
Law 99, no. 4 (2005): 778–816.
25! For example, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, In Pursuit of Peace (The Hague: Women’s Initiatives for 
Gender Justice, 2010), 5, 10–11, 17–19, 28–30, 33; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, UNSCR 
1325: Women’s Participation and Gender Perspectives in Security Council Resolutions Checklist (New York, NY: NGO 
Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 2006), 2, http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-
SCR_1325_Checklist_EN.pdf; Shepherd, ‘Power and Authority in the Production of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325’, 391. The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, based at UN 
Headquarters, is a coalition of major human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, the International Rescue Committee, the Open Society Institute, the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom and others. See http://womenpeacesecurity.org/about/ for more details.
26! United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325, 3; Pam Spees, ‘Women’s Advocacy in the Creation of the 
International Criminal Court: Changing the Landscapes of Justice and Power’, Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 28, no. 4 (2003): 1248–1249. See also Kirsten Ainley, ‘The International Criminal Court on 
Trial’, Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs 24, no. 3 (2011): 309–333.
27! Sahana Dharmapuri, ‘Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Putting the Responsibility to 
Protect into Practice’, Global Responsibility to Protect 4, no. 2 (2012): 241–272; Inger Skjelsbæk, ‘Responsibility to 
Protect or Prevent? Victims and Perpetrators of Sexual Violence Crimes in Armed Conflicts’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect 4, no. 2 (2012): 154–171.
although they do so imperfectly, and thus can be scrutinised in terms of their assumptions of 
structure, agency, morality and causality. 
For example, the emphasis on individual legal responsibility for rape in international 
tribunals has been seriously challenged on a number of grounds. For some,  the apparently 
individual focus of trials actually masks a much more problematic assignment of collective 
responsibility to cultures and nations. On this account, feminist activism reinforced ideas of 
rape as the product of collective entities like 'Serb' which are frequently racialised in popular 
conceptions of war.28  The actual pattern of war rape cases pursued by the ICC is similarly 
charged with perpetuating colonial tropes of barbarism, subjecting only Africans to 
examination for sexual violence.29  The narrative of developmental progress within 1325 
itself can be seen as marginalising certain radical feminist alternatives via a distinctly liberal 
view of subjectivity.30  Current understandings of responsibility for war rape can similarly be 
read as expressing an overly individualist view of politics and suffering, with survivors 
characterised as isolated victims of trauma, rather than participants in a complicated social 
structure of  gender power.31
Male Responsibility for War Rape
How, then, to think of men's responsibility for rape in war? In the most apparently 
uncontested sense, men are responsible as individuals for rape where they are the person 
who engages in the act itself, where they had free choice in doing so, and where they had full 
(or near full)  awareness of the likely consequences of their actions. This would be a classic 
expression of direct moral responsibility,  more-or-less aligned to formal legal responsibility 
for rape, which might be mitigated by certain factors said to decrease responsibility (such as 
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28! Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents’.
29! Ann Sagan, ‘African Criminals/African Victims: The Institutionalised Production of Cultural Narratives in 
International Criminal Law’, Mi!ennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 (2010): 3 –21; Ainley, ‘The 
International Criminal Court on Trial’, 319–329. The ICC is currently investigating cases in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire and Libya. Rape 
features as a war crimes charge in all country situations except Libya. 
30! Shepherd, ‘Power and Authority in the Production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’, 398–
400. cf. Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella, and Sheri Gibbings, ‘Women, Peace and Security Resolution 1325’, 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 6, no. 1 (2004): 130–140.
31! See Carol Harrington, Politicization of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping (London: Ashgate, 2010).
coercion or some inability to understand the likely consequences)  or aggravated by others 
(such as the use of additional forms of violence).32 Men might also be commonly thought of 
as individually responsible in a command sense, in either civilian or military roles, where 
they oversaw, ordered or were in a position to prevent acts of rape, a conception of moral, 
political and causal responsibility with direct parallels in the law of  war.33
Yet what of the wider senses of responsibility gestured to by critics of the individualised 
approach to prosecution and blame? Consider Claudia Card's characterisation of 
'peacetime' rape as a terrorist institution in which men are complicit:
Rape in civil [sic] society is a social practice governed by complex informal norms 
that are taught and learned early. The norms define positions,  privileges and 
liabilities. They define what counts as tacit consent or provocation ('a woman 
alone is  asking for it'). They define who can and who cannot be raped ('a wife 
cannot be raped by her husband';  'a prostitute cannot be raped' – that is, nothing 
done to either counts as rape). As with slavery,  the rules vary with time and place. 
The consequence for women in general (not just those raped) is patriarchal 
protectionism, under which women provide, for protection against assault, 
services that range from laundry and cookery to childcare and sex.34
This reasoning is applicable, perhaps more so, to contexts of war rape, where the collective 
military, political and social benefits for men are often held to be more pronounced than in 
peace. Extending Susan Brownmiller's oft-cited view of the 'critical function' of rape as that 
“conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear”, it also 
reflects what Inger Skjelsbæk calls the 'essentialist' conceptualisation of wartime sexual 
violence in which all women are potential victims of rape, which is aimed at establishing a 
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32! For a discussion of direct moral responsibility, see Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Social Structures and Their Threats to 
Moral Agency’, Philosophy 74, no. 3 (1999): 312... This is merely an example to establish the simplest cases of 
responsibility for rape. There is, of course, a long history of excuses for individual rape and of attempts to 
combat such excuses through feminist activism. I deliberately do not deal with various mitigating factors in 
law or social attitudes which seek to place responsibility on victims and survivors for rape. See Joanna Bourke, 
Rape: A History 'om 1860 to the Present (London: Virago, 2007); Henderson, ‘Rape and Responsibility’; Rozée 
and Koss, ‘Rape’.
33! Crawford, ‘Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity’.
34! Claudia Card, Con'onting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 71.
general masculine power.35  A similar argument points out that, as well as being a more 
individualised form of torture or terrorist atrocity, rape can also be part of the social death 
of genocide.36  Political-military coalitions seeking the symbolic cleansing of a people by 
forced impregnation, or what Card  aptly calls 'sperm as a biological weapon', are the 
collective agents of a wrong, and participants within that group can be attributed 
responsibility for contributing to those ends. 
In other words, men may bear a special responsibility for rape even where they are not 
themselves in positions of direct or command responsibility for its occurrence. On this view, 
one can be complicit in, and therefore responsible for, a moral wrong even if one is not 
causally connected in any necessary way and even if one could not prevent the act by acting. 
This is what Card,  following Christopher Kutz, calls the 'ratification' of evil.37  Non-rapists 
may lack direct, command or bystander responsibility, but nevertheless 'stabilise'  the practice 
of rape through habits  of toleration and through perpetuating rape culture by speaking in 
certain ways,  or by failing to speak out. In this sense, men may be collectively responsible as 
participants in patriarchy where wrongs are linked to pervasive social norms.
Genocidal rape is often analysed primarily as coordinated and pre-planned action, which in 
some ways risks reducing to direct and command responsibility. Larry May, together with 
Robert Strikwerda, has addressed more clearly collective moral responsibility in the absence 
of such planning. Drawing comparisons with war crimes and with the collective 
responsibility of a society for crimes against humanity, May and Strikwerda propose that 
“insofar as male bonding and socialization in groups contributes to the prevalence of rape in 
western societies, men in those societies should feel responsible for the prevalence of rape 
and should feel motivated to counteract such violence and rape”.38 Since rape is carried out 
by many men, and not just sadists, they argue that the probability of a boy growing up to be 
a rapist is “as much a matter of luck as it is a matter of choice” and “the typical 
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35! Brownmiller, Against Our Wi!, 15, emphasis in original; Skjelsbæk, ‘Sexual Violence and War’, 215–218; cf. Kirby, 
‘How Is Rape a Weapon of War?’, 4–5.
36! Card, Con'onting Evils, 267–293.; cf. Lisa Sharlach, ‘Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and 
Rwanda’, New Political Science 22, no. 1 (2000): 89–102; Lene Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the 
Construction of Security’, International Feminist Journal of Politics 3, no. 1 (2001): 55–75. 
37! Card, Con'onting Evils, 65.
38! May and Strikwerda, ‘Men in Groups’, 135.
rapist...could have been many men” .39 
May and Strikwerda thus propose a view of the rapist as a group member. More specifically, 
they identify two senses in which men in groups are responsible for rape. The first is by 
nondistributive collective responsibility,  which is the term they give to situations in which men act 
together in a collectivity as “some sort of super-entity that causes,  or at least supports,  the 
prevalence of rape” and where responsibility is vested in an organisational structure like a 
corporation or a temporary collective agent like a mob.40  An army directed towards rape as 
a means of ethnic cleansing would be a clear expression of nondistributive collective 
responsibility. But there is also distributive collective responsibility,  which applies to kinds of 
oppression which are systematic but not organised.41 Men in general appear to meet this condition 
in five ways: i)  as direct perpetrators of rape; ii) as facilitators of rape by contributing to a 
rape climate, especially in interactions with younger men; iii)  as potential 'stand-ins' for 
actual rapists, since, on May and Strikwerda’s account, most men would act similarly in 
situations where constraints and inhibitions were removed; iv) via responsibility by omission 
in not stopping actual rapes where it is  possible to do so; and v)  as beneficiaries of rape to 
the extent that rape maintains general social advantages for men over women. Since few 
men could be excluded from all of those areas of responsibility May and Strikwerda 
conclude that “it is not unreasonable to say that men in our society are collectively 
responsible (in the distributive sense) for rape”.42  An analogous set of considerations applies 
for war rape, where distributive responsibility may be even greater.43
This formulation is convincing on several grounds. However, there are also a number of 
reasons to be cautious about their attribution of collective responsibility to men as a group. 
Most accounts of responsibility would accept elements (i) and (iv) of their case, namely that 
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men are individually directly responsible when they rape and individually, as bystanders, 
responsible when they do not stop a rape that they reasonably could. There may be some 
dispute over what could count as 'reasonable' action here, just as element (ii) – that men are 
individually responsible as facilitators – causes problems primarily in relation to our 
understanding of the number of acts and beliefs that could count as 'facilitating' in this sense 
and the accompanying degree of responsibility attributable. In other words, these three 
elements seem compatible with standard understandings of individual,  or non-collective, 
responsibility.44
The central elements required to establish collective responsibility are (iii)  and (v): 
responsibility as hypothetical stand-in and responsibility by benefit. (iii) is particularly open 
to interpretation, since the responsibility here only applies to individuals who would 
potentially  have acted like a rapist,  and only where inhibitions have been removed. But this 
risks tautology, since the various attitudes that might prevent men from raping have been 
excluded from consideration.  Depending on the exact content of inhibitions described, the 
category of ‘potential rapist’ would appear to include all living persons,  including all 
women. It requires no action (or non-action) but merely the possibility  of involvement in 
hypothetical scenarios. Element (v)  introduces an important consideration,  but leaves open 
what might be involved in a benefit and what connection is necessary (in terms of 
knowledge, joint commitment or shared membership) for the responsibility to hold. If the 
criteria is only that a causal link can be made from some rapes to enhanced power or 
prestige for certain groups, this may well establish collective responsibility, but there is no 
particular reason to think that the group will not include a substantial number of women or 
exclude a substantial number of  men.
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The Structure and Agency of  Multiplied Masculinities
It is thus still unclear why 'men', as a generalised category, should constitute the group to be held 
collectively responsible. Convincing examples refer not to men as a to general but to 
concrete and specific collections of men such as violent mobs, groups of soldiers or 
corporate entities. Where wider entities and social norms are implicated, they appear to 
exceed a restriction to men, instead characterising social orders in which individuals of 
multiple sexual and gender positions may be complicit. Put otherwise, May and Strikwerda's 
account is institutionally under-specified. Analysis of masculine collectives, such as the 
military or street gangs, suggests that there are indeed ways in which such groups promote 
and produce rape-conducive beliefs and much higher levels of rape than are observable in 
'normal'  background conditions.45 This institutional specificity requires a moral calculus that 
goes beyond a narrow individualism, since these behaviours are the product of male 
socialisation in a diverse and complicated sense. An extensive literature has grown up 
around this problem of multiple masculinities in recent decades, and responsibility talk 
should reflect this.46 But this requires a change in register from morality to sociology, or from 
discussions of  moral responsibility to discussions of  causal responsibility. 
Adopting this  kind of lens may better connected different layers of men and male 
responsibility, but also proliferates complexities. In accounting for particular events of rape 
in war,  we may well end up attributing responsibilities of omission and benefit at a societal 
level as well as additional direct, command and bystander responsibilities at the level of 
complex corporate entities like the state and its government, but also direct, facilitating and 
command responsibility to the military units involved (perhaps with some exceptions for lack 
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of knowledge or active resistance) and further facilitating responsibility to a range of 
established historical norms which provided the background legitimacy for the acts. 
Moreover, there will likely be an interaction between attributions of collective responsibility 
and more conventional charges of individual blame, especially where elements of hierarchy 
are lacking, for example where there is not a superior-subordinate relationship or where 
there is a gap between the actions of some members of a group and the knowledge of those 
acts by other members.47
The difficulty in clearly establishing men's collective moral responsibility for rape in all its 
complexity reflects two kinds of problems: collective responsibility as an idea itself, and the 
connection between ideas of moral responsibility with debates about structure and agency in 
accounts of causal responsibility. The problem of collectives and the structure/agency problem 
together destabilise and at points even reverse the assumptions about the appropriate blame 
attributable to men for rape. There is thus a disjuncture between arguments for moral and 
legal responsibility at the individual and collective levels and gender analytical accounts of 
causal responsibility which examine war rape as a collective social practice. 
Some of these difficulties lie in the idea of a collective itself. States, mobs and random 
groups of individuals do have a kind of collective presence that enables a different order of 
behaviour, since the capacities of individuals change when they come together with others.48 
This is the condition for collective action,  one often related to the presence of effective 
decision-making structures and joint commitments which bind groups together. But the 
association between collective action – a sociological observation about changes in capacity 
brought on by relational interactions – does not in itself establish collective responsibility – 
which is a moral claim not about blame falling on individuals within a group but about 
blame falling on the group itself. 
It is this  connection which forms a major line of dispute in debates about responsibility. 
Against assertions of collective responsibility, Jan Narveson holds that “when groups are said 
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to be responsible for this or that, the implication has to be that we may blame (or praise) 
members of the group, insofar as they are members, for the action(s)  in question”.49 
Whatever content may be given to claims about groups, these must in the end be supported 
by claims about individual members of  the group and actions which they have taken:
No group can claim the authority to penalize individuals who have done nothing 
relevantly describable as oppressive or aggressive to others, and this for the reason 
that there is no intelligible way to attribute victimhood to any group in the 
absence of overt individually violent (or otherwise wrongful) acts by members of 
other groups against members of it. Underlying  individualism is the only  rational meta-
theory for collective responsibility.50
Importantly, this does not mean that a group is nothing but the sum of its parts. For 
Narveson, the requirement of underlying individualism in no way precludes a central role 
for groups. Specifically, he argues that there are acts which only make sense when thought of 
as a group activity. Where an individual strikes a ball, this act only takes on its  proper 
significance where there are a number of other people playing assigned roles within a field 
or pitch, who confer a status on the act by virtue of their involvement.51  In other words, the 
group context makes the action meaningful. In this sense Narveson follows a tradition of 
interpretive analysis recognising the centrality of social norms and roles, without therefore 
endorsing a thorough-going conception of collective responsibility.52  However, although 
moral responsibility only makes sense in the context of a group act, this does not mean that 
it is the group that is morally responsible for the action. Again, the exact sense of 'collective' 
becomes vital:
If the guilt is strictly collective, then you cannot punish anyone in the collective for 
it, equally or otherwise; irreducibility precludes this. In punishing this man, that 
woman, this other man, this child, and so on, all equally, we would be behaving as 
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if each of those individuals was equally guilty. But if the action for which they are 
being punished is that of an irreducible collective, then that is false. You cannot 
reduce the irreducible – that is the whole point. Irreducibility  means that you cannot 
reduce, rather than that reduction must be carried through in a particular way.53
Indeed, we could say that the advantage of command responsibility is that, while it 
recognises a collective process and structure (that which allows the command to function in 
the first place) it remains individual, allowing the prosecution of differentiated persons for 
their active roles in authorising atrocity.54  It is only possible in the presence of groups and 
the authorisation they bestow – what May calls vicarious agency – but setting this as a proof 
of collective responsibility means that we may not be able to hold individuals morally 
responsible at all.55  This is itself a central claim of those who propose collective 
responsibility. If all are guilty none can be singled out for particular blame.56  Similarly, we 
cannot derive or automatically establish the responsibility of an individual member of a 
collective even if we can establish the responsibility of the collective.57  For May, in the case 
of mob action, since the intention of the collective activity is not reflectively understood by 
the participants, mob members should not be held individually responsible for the actions of 
the group.58
In the case of rape and collective responsibility,  the stark consequences of this way of 
putting the problem become apparent, and take us closer to the problematic dislocation of 
causal responsibility from moral responsibility. It suggests that patriarchy is responsible for 
rape but that men in patriarchy  are not. If even mobs and random collectives count as responsible 
group agents in this sense, then it may become impossible to punish or judge individuals 
who rape in those circumstances, leaving only individual cases of 'direct' rape outside of a 
group context as the subject of individual liability (and maybe not even then). Collective 
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responsibility thus extends responsibility,  bringing in new kinds of group actors (aggregates, 
mobs, corporations, armies and states), and modifies the grounds on which people can be 
responsible (not only by virtue of their direct behaviour, but also in their assigned social roles 
and institutions). But it does not replace individual responsibility. Collective moral 
responsibility therefore comes to face the same disjunction with causal responsibility as its 
more narrow individual counterpart. If proper explanations from social context mitigate 
individual responsibility, they also alter collective responsibility. They may even do so more, 
since collective responsibility displaces blame in multiple directions. Structural accounts of 
rape illuminate the social sources of violent misogyny, and so guard against reductions of 
rape to individual pathology or lust, but therefore demand a more sophisticated account of 
who to hold responsible for rape in the wake of feminist analysis, or risk eradicating the 
question of  guilt altogether.59
Structuring and De-Structuring Rape Accounts
Whether to consider social behaviour as the outcome of aggregated individual acts or as the 
result of systematic pressures and processes is a long-established issue in social theory: an 
agency/structure problem underlying all accounts of social behaviour.60  The contest 
between structure and agency is thus a debate around the appropriate ways of talking about 
causal responsibility, although, historically, ideas of cause have been closely connected to ideas 
of blame and guilt.61 Most accounts describe a complex interaction between these structure 
and agency, and gender has been no exception.62 The structural perspective attributes causal 
responsibility just as it makes difficult claims of moral responsibility. Following May and 
Strikwerda’s account, “rape is deeply embedded in a wider culture of male socialization”.63 
Moreover, although “[r]ape is normally committed by individual men but...rape is not best 
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understood in individualistic terms”.64  But if men are the products of patriarchy (and 
masculine gender orders more generally) which constrain their freedoms and sense of self 
through what amounts to a gender indoctrination, appeals to their choice and responsibility 
with respect to rape and other gendered behaviours are complicated.65   So, although 
responsibility attributions are often presented as self-evident, there is no way for them not to 
entail a constructed and imagined agent,  often one that conforms to individualist and 
rationalist criteria.66
As Alasdair MacIntyre expressed clearly more than a decade ago, ideas of moral agency and 
responsibility are undermined when we think about the effects of social structure on action. 
Occupying certain social roles requires a fidelity to their rules and standards and when a 
particular moral exclusion is  written into those roles – as in MacIntyre's example of a prison 
train driver in Nazi Germany or in ours of a war rapist in conditions of extreme patriarchy 
– fulfilling them becomes synonymous with not being aware of the effects of our actions, and 
not being able to predict that certain wrongs will result.67 The usual preconditions for moral 
agency (and therefore moral responsibility) “can be satisfied only within social orders in 
which there exist milieus, spheres of activity, which sustain the relevant kind of 
understanding of the self, the relevant kind of critical discourse and reflection, and the 
relevant kind of accountability” required to challenge harmful social roles (MacIntyre 1999, 
321).68  In other words, the more patriarchal the context, and the less space for challenging 
patriarchal attitudes and behaviours within it, the less morally responsible actors are for their 
behaviour within their assigned social roles. It is precisely in the most brutal social structures 
of  war rape, then, where the moral responsibility of  individuals will have the least traction.
MacIntyre's  response to this tension is actually to see additional responsibility arising for 
individuals on the grounds that agents can be held morally responsible even where they did 
not have socially reasonable knowledge of the outcomes for their actions. This is because, 
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for MacIntyre, responsibility adheres in the act of compartmentalisation necessary to 
inhabit harmful social roles themselves,  so that agents become responsible as 'co-
conspirators'  in a project to create 'blamelessly compliant lives' for themselves.69  But the 
challenge posed by social structure to moral responsibility persists, particularly in relation to 
patriarchy. Unlike the briefer interlude of a war disrupting non-war consciousness with new 
roles, feminist have consistently stressed the connection of rape and sexual violence to other 
forms of gendered power on a continuum that encompasses many more areas of social 
existence. Where rape is traced to underlying cultures of masculinity that shape whole 
subjectivities70, it becomes unclear where the space outside patriarchy might exist for those 
who go on to perpetuate war rape. In MacIntyre's own terms, “we all begin with the 
unquestioned”.71 
Similar tensions are thrown up in the more straightforwardly analytical accounts of rape 
given by Catharine MacKinnon and Susan Brownmiller, the two preeminent feminist 
theorists of rape. Although both are often charged with reductivism of one kind or another 
– usually in reducing rape to sex or power/violence72  – I want to suggest that closer 
attention to their claims reveals the move between different levels of men's moral 
responsibility for rape, and that this movement is closely related to problems of causal 
responsibility in terms of  structure and agency.
Catharine MacKinnon, although somewhat inclined to an interpretation of rape in terms of 
compulsory heterosexuality - “if it's violence not sex why didn't he just hit her”?73  – 
nevertheless interprets maleness as very much a social product: “Male is  a social and 
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political concept,  not a biological attribute...it has nothing  whatever to do with inherency, 
preexistence, nature, inevitability, or body as such”; “the good news is, it's not biological”.74 
Yet men adhere to the 'male'  perspective “nonconsciously and without considering it a point 
of view” at least partly because “it is in their interest. It is rational for them. A few men 
reject it: they pay”.75  Thus male domination becomes simultaneously the product of a 
learned social role, an unconscious process and a rational choice. The role of pornography 
and systematic male dispositions also emerge strongly in MacKinnon's later argument that 
the extent of rape in Bosnia was fundamentally related to the 'saturation' of Yugoslavia with 
pornography before the war, resulting in a dehumanisation of women that encouraged 
sexualised brutality.76 
Brownmiller's early, and still very influential, feminist account of rape constructs a view of 
rape in a similarly problematic way. It establishes one view of what rape as a system might 
entail in bold terms: “nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by 
which all men keep all women in a state of fear”.77  This instrumentalist tone is combined with 
an almost primal account in which rape “reveals the male psyche in its boldest form, without 
the veneer of 'chivalry' or civilization” where “a female victim of rape in war is chosen not 
because she is representative of the enemy, but precisely because she is a women, and therefore 
an enemy”.78 This seems to suggest both that rape is in men's interests and that they choose 
it (which would easily lead to a conclusion of moral responsibility by benefit) but also that 
there are strong elements of patriarchy that escape such reflection (which mitigates both 
individual and collective responsibility since there has been no conscious commitment to a 
project of  male power).
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Much of Brownmiller's analysis also introduces important qualifiers in identifying 
institutional and socio-cultural dimensions of predatory masculinity much closer to a 
variegated sense of responsibility: “That some men rape provides a sufficient threat to keep 
all women in a constant state of intimidation, forever conscious of the knowledge that the 
biological tool must be held in awe for it to may turn to weapon with sudden swiftness born 
of harmful intent”.79 Likewise, “[p]rison rape is...an acting out of power roles within an all-
male, authoritarian environment in which the younger, weaker inmate, usually a first 
offender, is forced to play the role that in the outside world is assigned to women”.80 Her use 
of evidence similarly suggests much more variation than is suggested by the idea of rape as 
fundamentally and inherently a property of maleness. Like May, Brownmiller is concerned 
primarily with challenging fables of female guilt and dismissing apologetics for male power, 
and so spends much less time elaborating a scaffolding to resolve such gaps between a 
general claim about men and the evidence of differentiated and complex expressions of 
gender order.
 
In both MacKinnon and Brownmiller there thus is an oscillation between the ubiquitous 
and the singular, the general and the specific, and the normal and the pathological. It is 
perhaps not coincidental that both are centrally concerned with processes of law, where the 
movement between individual responsibility and a general societal pattern becomes 
particularly salient. In effect,  both MacKinnon and Brownmiller struggle with the 
complexities of causal and moral responsibility, combining both while maintaining a 
political orientation that draws men and women's attention to the ways in which men benefit 
from rape even where they are not perpetrators. Card, May and Strikwerda, MacKinnon 
and Brownmiller all provide accounts which highlight the political and social character of 
male power. They therefore provide reasons for starting from a certain level of analysis to 
best understand rape. However, they also provide reasons for thinking of individual agents 
or perpetrators as expressions of that social level, and so at points move us away from a way 
of holding individual men responsible for acts.81  The strange effect of talking about chronic 
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and powerful social structures of masculinity and patriarchy in this way then threatens to 
“denude the social field of human agency. We have agency, but no human activity”.82  Nor 
are attributions of  genuinely collective responsibility without practical consequence:
Recognizing that responsibility for atrocity is fundamentally collective as well as 
individual, and political as well as legal, necessitates innovative institutional 
responses. Tasking bodies other than courts to determine some significant aspects 
of the responsibility for war crimes would reduce excesses of responsibility, and 
lessen the reliance by courts on such doctrines as joint criminal enterprise to 
sanction those actors who are implicated politically but not,  perhaps, criminally in 
atrocity.83
The question, then, is not only how to reconcile moral and causal responsibility, but also 
how to translate such resolutions onto a political stage.
Conclusive Responsibilities
This analysis has sought to make clearer the closely intertwined character of feminist 
analysis and ethics and to draw attention to the co-dependency of moral claims on causal 
ones. This connection is not surprising when we understand that ways of asking for causal 
explanation can themselves be aiming at a more fundamental level for a moral accounting of 
reasons for action.84  We have seen some arguments for the special extension of male 
responsibility for rape to situations of wartime sexual violence. Criticisms of individual legal 
responsibility either as inappropriately assigning special guilt to racialised socio-cultural 
communities or as conducive to myths of pathological individuals acting separately from a 
generalised social context demanded a different approach. More analytically compelling 
arguments for the collective responsibility of men as facilitators and beneficiaries of war 
rape offered one such alternative, but proved ultimately unsatisfactory. It was never clear 
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that men as a generalised category constituted the appropriate group for blame and, 
following Narveson, arguments for collective responsibility were seen to importantly require 
an underlying individualism of responsibility. More significantly, the problem of 
responsibility was shown to exceed the opposition of individual and collective forms. Rather, 
a problem adheres to ways of thinking about responsibility for war rape at all given the 
emphasis on patriarchy as a structure in feminist and gender theory. Recognising this 
becomes especially important if we endorse a feminist ethic that necessarily goes beyond 
moral judgement into an account of  how social structures may be transformed.85 
The result is a seeming paradox setting causal and moral responsibility against each other. 
Where feminist and gender arguments elaborate the patriarchal social structures that make 
rape such a consistent element of collective violence they either lessen or eradicate 
altogether attributions of moral responsibility to actors. The blame falls not on men, but on 
orders of militarised masculinity. The paradox is seeming because there may be ways to re-
think it, as MacIntyre does in trying to be clearer about what we can be held responsible for. 
What is required is a more differentiated understanding, one which could both find 
individuals less responsible, in the sense that a perpetrator was compelled or socialised into 
an institution,  but also bring in other actors, such as those who helped shape the masculine 
norms that led to the rape in society at large or in specific military training. Importantly, by 
not endorsing the claim that individuals escape responsibility by virtue of the collective 
action of a group, we the door to an account of moral responsibility which acknowledges 
the role of groups without granting them full autonomy in the sense that Narveson aptly 
critiques. Such an approach might parallels attempts to understand causal responsibility by 
conceiving of agency as an embodied practice reflecting and reworking structural 
elements.86
But this does not settle a more foundational set of questions. It does not determine whether 
a 'fit' between causal and moral stories should be our aim and it does not establish the way in 
which their tension should be re-evaluated. Nor has this discussion investigated cases where 
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members of a group actively seek to leave oppressive structures, an action that surely has 
bearing on our notions of agency, choice and responsibility. What it has foregrounded is a 
more general problem: that it is precisely in those contexts where patriarchy is strongest and 
rape culture most prevalent that there may be least responsibility in moral terms for harmful 
actions, since the ideological character of patriarchy renders participants less free and 
conscious in their understandings of gender, while it will be in egalitarian situations where 
rape culture has largely broken down where individuals will be most conscious and aware of 
the moral character of the act of rape and the harms associated with it, and hence 
potentially most responsible for rapes where they do occur. This is a way of saying that 
structural accounts of patriarchy and collective and individual levels of responsibility may be 
inverse, or that the strength of causation over individual action attributed to a gender order 
is in inverse proportion with the amount of  blame attributable to concrete individuals.
There are plausible dangers on both sides. On the one hand, an excessive focus on the 
collective character of patriarchy might result in unsupportable generalisations about the 
behaviours of different men in different contexts. Moreover,  if transferred to the realms of 
political and legal responsibility, it may allow the direct perpetrators of rape and sexual 
violence to escape sanction on the grounds that they were caught up in processes beyond 
their control, merely acting out the social roles assigned them. On the other hand, directing 
moral condemnation primarily at individual actors neglects the inescapably social contexts 
in which they act. By attributing guilt only to those individuals closest to sexual violence, we 
might punish those with least awareness or control of their behaviours, condemning them as 
symptoms of more widely dispersed structures properly responsible for morally repugnant 
acts. In this sense at least, an understanding of the causes and character of rape will support 
and improve our understanding of the moral choices before us. Especially where our 
accounts of rape feed into wider discourses about perpetrators, perpetuation and 
punishment, this kind of reflection – a fleshing of the category of 'man' – provides 
provisional grounds for political action toward the de-structuring of rape culture and 
patriarchy.
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